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Case No. 910190 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants misinterpret the State's argument and the case 
law. The standard of review to be applied is correction of error 
rather than abuse of discretion. Case law requiring the jury to 
exclude a reasonable hypotheses other than guilt does not support 
the court of appeals ruling. When the jury chose to disbelieve 
defendants and make the reasonable inferences of guilty knowledge 
from the circumstantial evidence, they had excluded all reasonable 
alternatives other than guilt. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANTS MISAPPREHEND THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS 
AND THE APPLICABLE LAW. 
In Point III of their brief, defendants state that the 
standard of review for this Court is that "[t]he trial court's 
order may be set aside only if it constitutes abuse of 
discretion, and is presumed correct. Corenevsky v. Superior 
Court, 682 P.2d 360 (Cal. 1984)." (Br. at 18). This is an 
incorrect statement of the standard of review to be applied by 
this Court, A trial court may arrest judgment only if it can do 
so as a matter of law. State v. Myers. 606 P.2d 250, 251 (Utah 
1980). Consequently the trial court's order and the court of 
appeals' decision were rulings on questions of law. This Court 
reviews questions of law for correctness and affords no deference 
to the lower courts. State v. Ramirez, 157 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 19 
n.3 (Utah 1991). 
Defendants also assert that the State misunderstands a 
critical difference between Myers and this case (Br. at 10) . 
They argue that because there was no witness testifying directly 
about their mental states, neither the trial court nor the court 
of appeals could have disbelieved any witness that the jury 
believed. However, it is not the State's position that these 
courts disbelieved a witness on the issue of defendant's 
knowledge. The State agrees that there was no witness who 
directly testified that defendants knowingly consented to or 
permitted Clinton Kelly's exploitation of their daughter. 
Indeed, it would be unusual if the State were able to produce a 
witness who could testify directly to the mental state of any 
defendant. See State v. Watts, 675 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 
1983)(requisite mental state for crimes most frequently inferred 
from circumstances). 
The State's position is that the jury must have dis-
believed the defendants' self-serving denials that they knowingly 
consented to or permitted Kelly's exploitation of their daughter. 
2 
Conversely, the jury must have believed the circumstantial 
evidence and made the reasonable inferences pointing to 
defendants' knowledge of his actions. Because the jury did not 
accept defendants' testimony, the courts were not free to accept 
it under the Myers standard. 
Defendants appear to assert that the jury is not free 
to disbelieve their testimony unless there is direct evidence 
refuting it. If this was the criterion for a criminal convic-
tion, few individuals would ever be convicted. It is not unusual 
for defendants to deny that they performed an act with the mental 
state necessary to establish the act as a crime. It is extremely 
unusual, on the other hand, for any witness to be able to testify 
that the defendant possessed a particular mental state. 
Defendants also urge that it is crucial that Kelly and 
defendants testified that defendants never saw the photograph 
(exhibit 16) and that no witnesses testified that they saw it 
(Br. at 13). This point is not as crucial as defendants contend. 
The sexual exploitation statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5a-3 (1990), 
does not require that the defendants see the finished product to 
have knowingly consented to or permitted its production. Thus, 
the jury could have believed the witnesses on this point and 
still have convicted defendants of sexual exploitation. 
Additionally, defendants argue that circumstantial 
evidence, to support a conviction, must exclude all other 
reasonable hypotheses (Br. at 14, citing Watts, 675 P.2d at 569). 
They contend that the lower court's ruling is supported by their 
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denials of guilt since no witnesses directly refuted them. This 
proposition is not as simplistic as defendants would have this 
Court believe. The Court has previously elaborated on the 
concept: 
It is true, as the defendant contends, that 
where a conviction is based on circumstantial 
evidence, the evidence should be looked upon 
with caution, and that it must exclude every 
reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of 
defendant. This is entirely logical, because 
if the jury believes that there is a reason-
able hypothesis in the evidence consistent 
with the defendant's innocence, there would 
naturally be a reasonable doubt as to his 
guilt. Nevertheless, that proposition does 
not apply to each circumstance separately, 
but is a matter within the prerogative of the 
jury to determine from all of the facts and 
circumstances shown; and if therefrom they 
are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of 
the defendant's guilt, it necessarily follows 
that they regarded the evidence as excluding 
every other reasonable hypothesis. 
State v. Schad, 470 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah 1970) (footnote omitted). 
In this case, the jury chose to disbelieve defendants' denials of 
guilt, and chose to infer from circumstantial evidence that 
defendants consented to or knowingly permitted Kelly's 
exploitation of E. Once the jury rejected defendants' claims of 
ignorance, and embraced the inferences of defendants' knowledge, 
they had excluded the only reasonable hypothesis other than 
guilt. Defendants may not parse the evidence and prevail by 
relying on the lack of testimony directly refuting defendants' 
claims of ignorance. 
Finally, defendants refer to standards established by 
the American Bar Association for directed verdicts and urges this 
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court to adopt these standards in Utah. Defendants emphasize 
that the ABA standard rejects the principle that the jury is the 
exclusive judge of the evidence (Br. at 19). Significantly, in 
this case, there was no directed verdict. While the trial court 
ordering a directed verdict is necessarily removing the case from 
the jury, a Utah court is not allowed to disregard the jury 
function and arrest judgment when there is evidence and 
reasonable inferences which, if believed by the jury, supports 
the verdict. Myers, 606 P.2d at 251. In order to apply the ABA 
directed verdict standard in an arrest of judgment setting, this 
Court would be required to overturn Myers and the longstanding, 
well-accepted rule that the jury is the sole determiner of the 
evidence. This Court should not overturn this well-established 
principle that is integral to the criminal law of this State. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State again requests this 
Court to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
reinstate the jury verdict. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this I lp day of December, 
1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
//SANDRA L. gjOGKEN (/ 
/ / Assistant Attorney General 
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I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Reply Brief of Petitioner were delivered to Edwin 
Beus, Attorney for Appellee, 36 South State Street, #1200, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this fID day of December, 1991. 
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